이번 보고서
2025 연차보고서
10-K · 기간 말 2025. 9. 30. · 제출 2025. 11. 6.
비교 기준
2024 연차보고서
10-K · 기간 말 2024. 9. 30.
0
새 리스크 항목
3
신규 문단
56
수정 문단
21
삭제
+2%
분량 변화
AI 한국어 요약
한 줄 요약
비자가 스테이블코인을 기존 결제망을 흔들 수 있는 경쟁 요인으로 새로 적었어요.
주목할 변화
- 신규스테이블코인 경쟁2025년 7월 미국 GENIUS Act 제정과 EU·영국·일본 등의 규제 정비를 근거로 들었어요. 규제가 명확해지면 스테이블코인이 "disrupt existing payment networks, including in cross-border and B2B transactions" 할 수 있다고 썼어요.
- 강화미국 직불카드 수수료 상한 소송2025년 8월 노스다코타 연방지법이 연준의 Regulation II 수수료 기준을 무효로 판단했다는 내용이 추가됐어요. 반면 켄터키 법원은 연준 손을 들어줬어요. 회사는 노스다코타 판결이 확정되면 "significantly lower interchange cap" 이 나올 수 있다고 적었어요. 신용카드 라우팅 법안(Credit Card Competition Act)은 "additional bipartisan support" 표현이 빠졌어요. 대신 재발의되거나 다른 법안에 끼워 넣어질 수 있다는 서술로 바뀌었어요.
- 강화해외 수수료 상한 확산뉴질랜드가 2025년 7월 해외 거래 수수료 상한을 도입했어요. 호주는 해외 거래 상한을 제안했고, 국내 상한도 더 낮추자고 제안했어요. 영국 PSR도 영국-유럽 간 거래에 "proposing to cap cross-border interchange" 한다고 갱신됐어요.
- 신규에이전틱 커머스와 AI 경쟁AI 에이전트가 대신 결제하는 구조에 대해 "Legal frameworks governing such autonomous agents remain nascent" 라고 새로 썼어요. 오결제·분쟁 결제·차지백 증가 가능성도 언급했어요. 경쟁사의 AI 활용으로 경쟁이 심해질 수 있다는 문단이 추가됐어요. 자사의 GenAI 도입이 "expand our cybersecurity attack surface" 할 수 있다는 문장도 생겼어요.
- 강화관세·무역 갈등과 미국 기업 인식거시 리스크 목록에 관세 인상, 무역 보복, 정부 셧다운이 들어갔어요. "changing perceptions of U.S.-based companies" 라는 표현이 새로 추가됐어요. 사업이 "the free flow of commerce across borders" 에 달려 있다는 문장도 생겼어요.
- 강화유럽의 탈(脫) 국제결제망 움직임예전엔 EPI가 결제 시스템을 출시할 "의향"이라고 적었어요. 이번엔 계좌 간 결제 시스템 Wero를 실제로 출시했다고 바뀌었어요. ECB가 디지털 유로를 "an alternative to foreign digital currency and payment service providers" 로 검토 중이라는 내용도 더해졌어요.
- 강화사이버보안·핵심 인프라 규제각국이 핵심 인프라 사이버보안 법을 새로 만들고 있고, 일부가 비자에 적용될 수 있다고 추가했어요. 시스템이 서로 얽혀 있어 장애가 "disrupt the overall financial system" 할 수 있다는 문장도 생겼어요. 외부 업체 사고 시 면책 보상이 충분하지 않을 수 있다는 내용도 추가됐어요.
- 강화CRS 목표 자체의 소송 위험지속가능성 관련 목표나 활동이 "anti-competitive, discriminatory or otherwise unlawful" 하다는 소송·조사를 부를 수 있다고 새로 적었어요. 인력 리스크 제목에서는 "diverse" 가 빠졌어요. 포용·다양성 목표 관련 문구도 삭제됐어요.
참고
Regulation II는 더빈 수정안(Durbin Amendment)에 따라 연준이 미국 직불카드 수수료 상한을 정한 규정이에요. 이번 보고서는 'merchant'를 'seller'로 바꿔 썼는데, 이건 용어 변경일 뿐이에요.
원문 비교
- Arab Emirates), to lessen dependence on the U.S. dollar and on Western payments systems by, among other things, integrating payments systems and cards across member countries.
- •In July 2025, the U.S. enacted the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act), establishing a comprehensive framework for regulating stablecoins. Similarly, the European Union has adopted its own legal framework for crypto assets. Many other countries, including the U.K., Japan, United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong and Singapore, are at varying stages of adopting stablecoin and digital assets-related regulatory frameworks. With more regulatory certainty and permissive or favorable regulations, stablecoins could potentially disrupt existing payment networks, including in cross-border and B2B transactions. In countries facing currency instability and controls, stablecoins could increasingly be used as an alternative to preserve and transfer asset value. In more mature markets, stablecoins could achieve broad adoption through regulated issuance by traditional banks, fintechs and other new entrants, as well as by being integrated in closed loop systems operated by large digital ecosystems and platforms.
- We are subject to dynamic, and sometimes conflicting laws, regulations and other directives that govern a wide array of issues, including some that extend beyond our core products and services. This includes, but is not limited to, matters that touch upon sustainability, climate change, people and talent management, equal opportunity and inclusion, supply chain management and human rights. A wide range of stakeholders, including governments, NGOs, consumers, partners, employees and investors, are increasingly attentive to these corporate responsibility matters and are developing expectations which at times may be discordant with each other and with Visa’s existing strategies and disclosure practices. For example, certain regulators have proposed or adopted, or plan to propose or adopt, rules or standards related to these matters that would apply to our business, including the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and the State of California’s legislation requiring broad disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions and other climate-related information.
- As a global payments technology company, we are subject to complex and evolving regulations that govern our operations. Such regulations may increase in quantity, complexity and scope in response to heightened geopolitical tensions. See Item 1—Government Regulation for more information on the most significant areas of regulation that affect our business. The impact of these regulations on us, our clients, and other third parties could limit our ability to enforce our payments system rules; require us to adopt new rules or change existing rules; affect our existing contractual arrangements; and increase our compliance
costs; and require us to make our technology or intellectual property available to third parties, including competitors, in an undesirable manner.costs. As discussed in more detail below, we may face differing rules and regulations in matters like interchange reimbursement rates, preferred routing, domestic processing and localization requirements, currency conversion, point-of-sale transaction rules and practices, privacy, data use and protection, licensing requirements and associated product technology. As a result, the Visa operating rules and our other contractual commitments may differ from country to country, state to state, orby products.product to product. Complying with these and other regulations increases our costs and operational complexity, and reduces our revenue opportunities. - Regulators around the world have been establishing or increasing their authority to regulate various aspects of the payments industry. See Item 1—Government Regulation for more information. In the U.S. and many other jurisdictions, we have historically set default
interchange reimbursement fees.IRFs. Even though we generally do not receive any revenue related tointerchange reimbursement feesIRFs in a payment transaction (in the context of credit and debit transactions, those fees are paid by the acquirers to the issuers; the reverse is true for certain transactions likeATM), interchange reimbursement feesATM transactions), IRFs are a factor on which we compete with other payments providers and are therefore an important determinant of the volume of transactions we process. Consequently, changes to these fees, whether voluntarily or by mandate, can substantially affect our overall paymentsvolumesvolume and net revenue. - •Regulations adopted by the U.S. Federal Reserve cap the maximum U.S. debit interchange reimbursement rate received by large financial institutions at 21 cents plus 5 basis points per transaction, plus a possible fraud adjustment of 1 cent. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act limits issuers’ and payment networks’ ability to adopt network exclusivity and preferred routing in the debit and prepaid area, which also impacts our business. In response to
merchantseller requests, the Federal Reserve has recently taken actions to revisit its regulations that implement these aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, in October 2022, the Federal Reserve published a final rule effectively requiring issuers to ensure that at least two unaffiliated networks are available for routingCNPecommerce debit transactions by July 1, 2023. In October 2023, the Federal Reserve issued a proposal for commentwhich wouldthat furtherlowerlowers debit interchange rates, with a mechanism for automatic adjustment every two years. Finally, in August 2025, the District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled that the Federal Reserve exceeded its authority in implementing Regulation II, which sets debit card interchange fees. The court found the Federal Reserve improperly included various costs beyond what the Durbin Amendment allows, such as fraud losses, network fees and other fixed costs, when setting the debit interchange fee standard. As a result, the court vacated Regulation II’s debit interchange fee standard. Subsequently, however, the District Court in Kentucky ruled that the Federal Reserve acted within its discretion in setting the debit interchange cap. If the District Court of North Dakota’s decision is affirmed on appeal and ultimately prevails, it could potentially result in the Federal Reserve setting a significantly lower interchange cap for relevant debit transactions in the U.S. Separately, there continues to be interest in regulation of credit interchange fees and routing practices by members of Congress and state legislators. It is possible that the Credit Card Competition Act may be reintroduced in Congress or attempted to be offered as an amendment to unrelated legislation. Previous versions of the legislation were introduced in 2022 and 2023, and required among other things, that large issuing banks offer a choice of at least two unaffiliated networks over which electronic credit transactions may be processed. Finally, some statesin the U.S.have passed or are considering passing laws that regulate how interchange can be set and assessed. For example, in May 2024, Illinois passed a law that restricts the assessment of interchange on the state tax and gratuity portions of a transaction, and restricts financial institutions and payment networks, among others, from using payment transaction data for any purpose other than facilitating or processing a transaction. While the Illinois law remains subject to legal challenge, if such laws are allowed to go into effect, they may also impose significant technical and compliance burdens on our business. In•In Europe, the EU’s IFR places an effective cap on consumer credit and consumer debit interchange fees for both domestic and cross-border transactions within theEEA (30European Economic Area of 30 basis points and 20 basis points,respectively).respectively. EU member states have the ability to further reduce these interchange levels within their territories. The European Commission has announced its intention to conduct another impact assessment of the IFR, which could result in even lower caps on interchange rates and the expansion of regulation to other types of products, services and fees.- •Several countries in Latin America continue to explore regulatory measures against payments networks and have either adopted or are exploring interchange caps, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica. In Asia Pacific, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) which already regulates interchange, recently proposed reducing existing interchange caps on domestic credit and debit transactions and not allowing differential interchange treatment for consumer and commercial transactions. Similarly, in New Zealand, the Commerce Commission recently lowered existing caps on domestic credit transactions. Interchange is also regulated in certain countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa region, including the United Arab Emirates. Finally, many governments, including but not limited to governments in India, Costa Rica, and Turkey, are using regulation to further drive down MDR, which could negatively affect the economics of our transactions.
- •While the focus of interchange and MDR regulation has primarily been on domestic
rates historically, there are several examples of increasing focusrates, interest on cross-border ratesin recent years.has been growing. For example,in 2019,we agreed to limit certain cross-border interchange rates in a settlement with the EuropeanCommission.Commission in 2019, which was extended through 2029. In 2020, Costa Rica became the first country to formally regulate cross-border interchange rates by regulation. In June 2022, the UK’s PSR initiated a market review focusing on post-Brexit increases in interchange rates for e-commerce transactions between the UK andEurope.Europe and is proposing to cap cross-border interchange on certain transactions in that geographic corridor. Most recently, in July 2025, New Zealand adopted interchange caps on cross-border transactions including commercial credit transactions. Australia has also proposed adopting caps for cross-border transactions. Cross-border MDR is also regulated in Costa Rica and Turkey. •As referenced above, with•With increased lobbying bymerchantssellers and other industry participants, we are also beginning to see regulatory interest in network fees. For example, the UK’s PSR is conducting a market review into scheme and processing fees. In its interim report, the PSR indicated that it is reviewing possibleremedies,remedies in the areas of governance, reporting and transparency, any of which, if adopted, could impose additional complexity and burdens on our business in the UK. Other regulators, for example, those in Australia, the EU, Chile andChile,New Zealand have expressed an interest in network fees, including issues related to transparency. Finally, in 2024, the Greek Parliament limited acquirer fees for certain small ticket transactions in somemerchantseller categories for a period of three years.- •In addition, industry participants in some countries, including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay,
Peru andPeru, South Africa and Turkey have sought intervention from competition regulators or filed claims relating to certain network rules, including Visa’s restrictions on cross-border acquiring. The CentralBankBanks of Chile and the Dominican Republic recently enacted regulation that will permit cross-border acquiring forCNPecommerce transactions under certain conditions. Other countries, like Brazil, have adopted regulations that require us to seek government pre-approval for certain of our network rules, which could also impact the way we operate incertainthose markets. - •We are also subject to central bank oversight in a growing number of countries, including Brazil, India, the UK and within the EU. In several jurisdictions, we have been designated as a “systemically important payment system.” Some countries with existing oversight frameworks are looking to further enhance their regulatory powers, while regulators in other jurisdictions are considering or adopting approaches based on these regulatory principles. For example, in October 2023, VisaNet was designated as a prominent payment system in Canada. These types of designations generally result in oversight of authorization, clearing and settlement activities, including policies, procedures and requirements related to governance, client and seller access to our payment systems, reporting, cybersecurity, processing infrastructure,
capital,capital and/or credit risk management. We could also be required to adopt policies and practices designed to mitigate settlement and liquidity risks, including increased requirements to maintain sufficient levels of capital and financial resources locally, as well as localized risk management or governance. - •As innovations in payment technology have enabled us to expand into new products and services, they have also expanded the potential scope of regulatory influence. For instance, new products and capabilities, including tokenization, push
payments,payments andnew flows (e.g., Visa B2B Connect)cross-border money movement solutions could bring increased licensing or authorization requirements in the countries where the product or capability is offered. Furthermore, certain portions of our business are regulated as payment institutions or as money transmitters, subjecting us to various licensing, supervisory and other requirements. As we continue to expand our capabilities and offerings in furtherance of ournetwork of networksmulti-year growth strategy, we will need to obtain new types of licenses. These licenses could result in increased supervisory and compliance obligations that are distinct from the obligations we are subject to in our capacity as a payment card network. - Regulators around the world increasingly take note of each other’s approaches to regulating the payments industry. Consequently,
adevelopment in one jurisdiction may influence regulatory approaches in another. The risks created by a new law, regulation or regulatory outcome in one jurisdiction have the potential to be replicated and to negatively affect our business in another jurisdiction or in other product offerings. For example, our settlement with the European Commission on cross-border interchange rates has drawnpreliminaryattention from some regulators in other parts of the world. Similarly, new regulations involving one product offering may prompt regulators to extend the regulations to other product offerings. For example, credit payments could become subject to similar regulation as debit payments (or vice versa). The RBA initially capped credit interchange, but subsequently capped debit interchange as well. - When we cannot set default interchange reimbursement rates at optimal levels, issuers and acquirers may find our payments system less attractive. This may increase the attractiveness of other payments systems, such as our competitors’ closed-loop payments systems with direct connections to both
merchantssellers and consumers. We believe some issuers may react to such regulations by charging new or higher fees, or reducing certain benefits to consumers, whichmakemakes our products less appealing to consumers. Some acquirers may elect to charge higher MDR regardless of the Visa interchange reimbursement rate, causingmerchantssellers not to accept our products or to steercustomersconsumers to alternative payments systems or forms of payment. In addition, in an effort to reduce the expense of their payment programs, some issuers and acquirers have obtained, and may continue to obtain, incentives from us, including reductions in the fees that we charge, which directly impacts our net revenue.Furthermore, theThe evolving andincreasedincreasing regulatory focus on the payments industry could negatively impact or reduce the number of Visa products our clients issue, the volume of payments we process, our net revenue, our brands, our competitive positioning, our ability to use our intellectual property to differentiate our products and services, the quality and types of products and services we offer, the countries in which our products and services are used, and the types of consumers andmerchantssellers who can obtain or accept ourproducts,products and services, all of which could harm our business and financial results. - Finally, policymakers and regulatory bodies in the U.S., Europe and other parts of the world are exploring ways to reform existing competition laws to meet the needs of the digital economy, including restricting large technology companies from engaging in mergers and acquisitions, requiring them to interoperate with potential competitors, and prohibiting certain kinds of self-preferencing behaviors. While the focus of these efforts remains primarily on increasing regulation of large technology, ecommerce and social media companies, they could also have implications for other types of companies including payments networks, which could constrain our ability to effectively manage our
business or potentially limit how we make our products and services available.business. Recent political developments around the world, including recent shifts in trade policy, have added additional uncertainty with respect to new laws and regulations or changes in the interpretations or enforcement of existing laws and regulations, and increased risk of financial regulatory fragmentation. - In China, UnionPay remains the predominant processor of domestic payment card transactions and operates the predominant domestic acceptance
mark.market. Although we filed an application with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in May 2020 to operate a Bank Card Clearing Institution (BCCI) in China, the timing and the procedural steps for approval remain uncertain. There is no guarantee that the license to operate a BCCI will be approved or, if we obtain such license, that we will be able to successfully compete with domestic payments networks. Co-badging and co-residency regulations also pose additional challenges in markets where Visa competes with national networks for issuance and routing. Certain banks have issued dual-branded cards for which domestic transactions in China are processed by UnionPay and transactions outside of China are processed byVisaVisa, UnionPay or other international payments networks. Although the PBOC has permitted Visa and UnionPay’s cooperation on upgrading magstripe dual-branded cards to chip cards, these modernization efforts are limited to existing cards and not new issuances.TheLooking forward, the PBOC iscontemplating thatconsidering phasing out dual-branded cardsbe phased outover time as new licenses are issued to international companies to participate in China’s domestic payments market.Accordingly,In response, we have been working with Chinese issuers to issue Visa-only branded cards for international travel, and later for domestic transactions should we obtain a BCCI license. However, notwithstanding such efforts,the phase out ofthese restrictions on dual-branded cardshashave decreased ourpayment volumespayments volume and impacted the net revenue we generate in China. RegulatoryOngoing regulatory initiatives in India, includingadata localizationmandate implemented by the government,requirements which continue to evolve, have cost implications for us and could affect our ability to effectively compete with domestic payments providers. Furthermore, any inability to meet the requirements of the data localization mandate could impact our ability to do business in India. In Europe, the European Central Bank has announced initiatives to reduce reliance on international payment networks. For example, with the support of the European Central Bank, the European Payments Initiative (EPI), led by a group of European banks, launched a pan-European A2A payment system, Wero. More recently, the European Central Bank has embarked on a multi-year effort to explore a digital euro, an alternative to foreign digital currency and payment service providers.Furthermore,In addition, regional groups of countries, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a number of countries in Southeast Asia (e.g., Malaysia), have adopted or may consider, efforts to restrict our participation in the processing of regional transactions. The African Development Bank has also indicated an interest in supporting national payment systems in its efforts to expand financial inclusion and strengthen regional financial stability. Finally, some countries such as Nigeria and South Africa are mandating on-shore processing of domestic transactions. Geopolitical events, includingsanctions,sanctions and trade tensionsor other types of activitieshave intensified these activities, which could adversely affect our business. For example, some countries have expressed concerns about their reliance on U.S. financial services companies, including payments networks, and have taken steps to bolster the development of domestic solutions, in light of U.S., European and UK sanctions against Russia and the decision by U.S. payments networks, including Visa, to suspend operations in the country. Separately, Russia has called for the BRICS countries(a five-country bloc made up of(led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and which has recently expanded to include countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, SaudiArabia,Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates), to lessen dependence on Western payments systems by, among other things, integrating payments systems and cards across member countries.- Central banks in a number of countries, including those in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe, India, Indonesia and Mexico, are in the process of developing or expanding national RTP networks and instant payment solutions with the goal of driving a greater number of domestic transactions onto these systems. In July 2023, the U.S. Federal Reserve launched its FedNow Service with core clearing and settlement functionality, and expects to add more features and enhancements over time. Some countries are also exploring cross-border connectivity of their respective RTP systems. Finally, an increasing number of jurisdictions are exploring the concept of building central bank digital currencies for retail payments, such as the European Central Bank’s digital euro initiative. If successfully deployed, these national payment platforms and digital currencies could have significant implications for Visa’s domestic and cross-border payments, including potential disintermediation.
- Due to our inability to manage the end-to-end processing of transactions for cards in certain countries (e.g.,
Thailand),Thailand, Mexico), we depend on our close working relationships with our clients or third-party service providers to ensure transactions involving our products are processed effectively. Our ability to do so may be adversely affected by regulatory requirements and policies pertaining to transaction routing or on-shore processing. In general, national laws that protect or otherwise support domestic providers or processing may increase our costs; decrease our paymentsvolumesvolume and impact the net revenue we generate in those countries; decrease the number of Visa products issued or processed; impede us from utilizing our global processing capabilities and controlling the quality of the services supporting our brands; restrict our activities; limit our growth and the ability to introduce new products, services and innovations; force us to leave countries or prevent us from entering new markets; and create new competitors, all of which could harm our business. - Our business relies on the processing of data across national borders. Legislators and regulators around the world are increasingly adopting or revising privacy, data protection, data management, data transfer, AI and cybersecurity laws and regulations. For example, our ongoing efforts to comply with complex U.S.
state privacyanddata protection regulations, and emerginginternational privacy and data protectionlaws,laws may increase the complexity of our compliance operations, entail substantial expenses, divert resources from other initiatives and projects, require us to modify our data processing practices, policies or services, andlimit the services we are able to offer.adversely impact our business. In addition, privacy laws in numerous jurisdictions, including but not limited to the U.S., China, India, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong and Japan, have established specific legal requirements for cross-border transfers of personal information and substantial compliance and audit obligations. Certain countries have also established specific legal requirements for data localization, such as where personal data must remain stored in the country. The global proliferation of new privacy and data protection laws may lead to inconsistent and conflictingrequirements,requirements or legal interpretations, which create an uncertain regulatory environment. Noncompliance could also result in regulatory penalties and significant legal liability. Enforcement actions and investigations by regulatory authorities into companies related to data security incidents and privacy violations are generally increasing. In Europe, data protection authorities continue to apply and enforce the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), imposing record setting fines.Further, asAs we develop integrated and personalized products and services and acquire new companies to meet the needs of a changing marketplace, we may expand our data profile through additional data types and sources, across multiple channels, and involving new partners. This potential expansion could amplify the impact of these various laws and regulations on our business. As a result, we are required to constantly monitor our privacy, data and cybersecurity practices and potentially change them when necessary or appropriate. We also may need to provide increased care in our data management, governance and quality practices, particularly as it relates to the use of data in products leveraging AI. - We are also subject to a variety of laws and regulations governing the development, use and deployment of AI technologies. These laws and regulations are increasingly complex, fragmented and still evolving, and there is no single global regulatory framework for AI. Our development, deployment and use of AI and machine learning is subject to various risks at each stage of use. In the context of AI development, risks include those related to intellectual property considerations, the collection and use of personal
information,data, third party risks, technical limitations of algorithms and the accuracy of training data, and compliance with emerging AI legal standards. The increased risk of inadvertent disclosure of confidential information or personal data in connection with the utilization of AI technologies may result in stronger regulatory scrutiny, leading to legal and regulatory investigations and enforcement actions that may negatively affect our business, even if unfounded. In the context of use and deployment, risks includeethicaltechnical, operational and compliance considerations, and our ability to monitor and safely deploy AI systems throughout the organization with appropriatesafeguards.safeguards and in compliance with the various regulatory schemes related to AI technology. - In particular, the adoption of agentic commerce, in which autonomous AI agents initiate and execute transactions on behalf of users, presents novel and complex regulatory, privacy and cybersecurity risks. Legal frameworks governing such autonomous agents remain nascent, with limited direct guidance specific to payments. The interplay between payments regulations, data privacy laws and evolving AI regulations may create uncertainty around compliance obligations and potential liability exposure as more participants (including sellers, fintechs, AI developers and enablers) enter the agentic commerce ecosystem. The market is still assessing how regulators may apply existing consumer protection and other laws in the context of AI. For example, as agentic commerce solutions scale, we may see increased instances of erroneous or disputed payments, increased chargebacks and reputational harm. Furthermore, reliance on agentic AI introduces challenges in monitoring cross-border, prohibited or high-risk transactions, where conflicting regulatory requirements may apply. The fragmented regulatory landscape for emerging technologies such as AI and inconsistent requirements across legal frameworks may amplify difficulties in identifying, preventing or mitigating risk with a single global approach, potentially increasing our compliance costs or stratifying our ability to leverage certain data or technologies for innovation. For instance, the EU has adopted a comprehensive AI Act that establishes harmonized rules across Europe, with key provisions for high-risk AI systems taking effect in August 2026. Meanwhile, several U.S. states, including California, Colorado and Utah, have adopted AI-specific frameworks or are considering applying existing consumer and data protection laws to regulate AI. Depending on how these different regulations are interpreted and enforced, they may limit the ability to develop and deploy AI systems or significantly increase associated compliance costs. Our development and implementation of governance frameworks
foraimed at complying with emerging laws and regulations applicable to our AI and machine learning systems may not be successful in mitigating all of these emerging risks. - The application of tax laws requires significant judgment and can be subject to uncertainty and differing interpretations. We are currently under examination by, or in disputes with, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service as well as tax authorities in other jurisdictions, and we may be subject to additional examinations or disputes in the future. We exercise significant judgment and make estimates that we believe to be reasonable in calculating our worldwide provision for income taxes and other tax liabilities. However, relevant tax authorities may disagree with our estimates, interpretations or tax treatment of certain material items. Failure to sustain our position in these matters could adversely affect our cash flows and financial position. In addition, changes in existing laws in the U.S. or foreign jurisdictions, including unilateral actions of foreign jurisdictions to introduce digital services taxes, or changes resulting from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s proposals for
modernizingthe international tax system, including the introduction of a global minimum tax with widespread implementation by membercountries expected by 2025,countries, may also materially affect our effective tax rate and could increase our tax payments. Please see Item 7 and Note 19—Income Taxes to our consolidated financial statements included in Item 8 of this report. - We are
involved insubject to numerous litigation matters, investigations, claims, examinations, information gathering requests, subpoenas, government and regulatory proceedings asserted by civil litigants,governments,governments and enforcement bodies investigating or alleging, among other things, violations of competition and antitrust law, consumer protection law, privacy law and intellectual property law (these are referred to as “actions” in this section). Details of the most significant actions we face are described more fully in Note 20—Legal Matters to our consolidated financial statements included in Item 8 of this report. These actions are inherently uncertain, expensive and disruptive to our operations. In the event we are found liable or reach a settlement in any action, particularly in a large class action lawsuit, such as one involving an antitrust claim entitling the plaintiff to treble damages in the U.S., or we incur liability arising from a government investigation, we may be required to pay significant awards or judgments, settlements, costs or fines. In addition, settlement terms, judgments, orders, pressures or events in or resulting from actions have impacted and may continue to impact our business by creating uncertainty for our business or by influencing or requiring us to modify, among other things, the default interchange reimbursement rates we set, the Visa operating rules or the way in which we enforce those rules, our fees or pricing, or the way we do business. These actions or their outcomes may also influence regulators, investigators, governments or civil litigants in the same or other jurisdictions, which may lead to additional actions against Visa. Finally, we are required by some of our commercial agreements to indemnify other entities for litigation brought against them, even if Visa is not a defendant. For certain actions like those that are U.S. covered litigation or VE territory covered litigation, as described in Note 5—U.S. and Europe Retrospective Responsibility Plans and Note 20—Legal Matters to our consolidated financial statements included in Item 8 of this report, we have certain financial protections pursuant to the respective retrospective responsibility plans. The two retrospective responsibility plans are different in the protections they provide and the mechanisms by which we are protected. The failure of one or both of the retrospective responsibility plans to adequately insulate us from the impact of such settlements, judgments, losses or liabilities could materially harm our financial condition or cash flows, or even cause us to become insolvent. - The global payments space is intensely competitive. As technology evolves and consumer expectations change, new competitors or methods of payment emerge, and existing clients and competitors assume different roles. Our products compete with cash, checks, electronic payments, virtual currency payments, global or multi-regional networks, other domestic and closed-loop payments systems, digital wallets and alternative payments providers primarily focused on enabling payments through ecommerce and mobile channels. As the global payments space becomes more complex, we face increasing competition from our clients, other emerging payment providers such as fintechs, other digital payments, technology companies that have developed payments systems enabled through online activity in ecommerce, social media, and mobile channels, other providers of
new flowsCMS andvalue-added serviceVAS offerings, as well as governments in a number of jurisdictions (e.g., U.S., Brazil andIndia) as discussed above,India), that are developing, supporting and/or operating national schemes, RTP networks and other payment platforms. For more information, please see Item 1—Competition above. - Our competitors may acquire, develop or make better use of substantially better technology, have more widely adopted delivery channels, or have greater financial resources. They may offer more effective, innovative or a wider range of programs, products and services. They may use more effective advertising and marketing strategies that result in broader brand recognition and greater use, including with respect to issuance and
merchantseller acceptance. They may also develop bettersecuritysolutions or offer more favorablepricing arrangements.pricing. Moreover, even if we successfully adapt to technological change and the proliferation of alternative types of payment services by developing and offering our own services in these areas, such services may provide less favorable financial terms forus than we currently receive from VisaNet transactions,us, which could hurt our financialresults and prospects.results. We expect to face more competition as AI continues to advance and GenAI and agentic AI capabilities become integrated into payments and related services in two main ways: first, by competitors successfully enhancing their products, services and external offerings with AI to achieve greater and faster product adoption; and second, by competitors providing internal AI tools to upskill their employees for greater operational efficiencies and impact. In addition, our competitors may have, or in the future may obtain, proprietary rights that would prevent, limit or interfere with our ability to design, use or sell our own AI-based offerings or services to our clients and other third parties. If we do not continue to invest in developing and supporting our AI-based initiatives, we may fall behind technological developments and evolving industry standards, which would likewise harm our reputation and ability to effectively compete, retain clients or grow our business. - Certain of our competitors operate with different business models, have different cost structures or participate in different market segments. Many of these competitors are also able to use existing payment networks without being subject to many of the associated costs. Moreover, these competitors also occupy various roles in the payments ecosystem that enable them to influence payment choice of other participants. Some of our competitors, including American Express, Discover, private-label card networks, virtual currency providers, technology companies that enable the exchange of digital assets, and certain alternative payments systems like Alipay and WeChat Pay, operate closed-loop payments systems, with direct connections to both
merchantssellers and consumers. Those business models may ultimately prove more successful or more adaptable to regulatory, technological and other developments. In some cases, these competitors have the support of government mandates that prohibit, limit or otherwise hinder our ability to compete for transactions within certain countries and regions. For more information on government actions, initiatives or regulations that could impact competition, please see Item 1—Government Regulation and Item 1A—Regulatory Risks above. - •We, along with our competitors, clients, network participants, and others are developing or participating in alternative payments systems or products, such as mobile payment services, ecommerce payment services, P2P payment services, real-time and faster payment initiatives, and payment services that permit
ACH or direct debits from or to consumer checking accounts, that could either reduce our role or otherwise disintermediate us from the transaction processing or the value-added services we provide to support such processing. - ACH or direct debits from or to consumer checking accounts, that could either reduce our role or otherwise disintermediate us from the transaction processing or the value-added services we provide to support such processing. Examples include initiatives from The Clearing House, an association consisting of large financial institutions that has developed its own faster payments system; Early Warning Services, which operates Zelle, a bank-offered alternative network that provides another platform for faster funds or real-time payments across a variety of payment types, including P2P, corporate and government disbursement, bill pay and deposit check transactions; and
cryptocurrency orcryptocurrency, including stablecoin-based payments initiatives. - •Participants in the payments industry may merge, form joint ventures or enable or enter into other business combinations or bilateral agreements that strengthen their existing business propositions or create new, competing payment services. For example, parties may agree not to use our payments network for processing transactions resulting in sellers processing transactions directly with issuers, or processors processing transactions directly with issuers and acquirers.
- •New or revised industry standards for or related to
online checkout and web payments, cloud-based payments, tokenization or other payments-related technologiespayments set by individual countries, regions or standard setting organizationssuch as the International Organization for Standardization, American National Standards Institute, World Wide Web Consortium, European Card Standards Group, PCI Co, Nexo and EMVComay result in additional costs and expenses for Visa and its clients, or otherwise negatively impact the functionality and competitiveness of our products and services. - As the competitive landscape is quickly evolving, we may not be able to foresee or respond sufficiently to emerging risks associated with new businesses, products, services and practices. We may be asked to adjust our local rules and practices, develop or customize certain aspects of our payment services, adjust the economics or pricing for our offerings, or agree to business arrangements that may be less protective of Visa’s proprietary technology and interests in order to compete and we may face increasing operational costs and risk of litigation concerning intellectual property. Our failure to compete effectively in light of any such developments could harm our business and prospects for future growth.
- Our net revenue and profits are dependent on our client and
merchantseller base, which may be costly to win, retain and develop. - Our financial institution clients and
merchantssellers can reassess their commitments to us at any time or develop their own competitive services. While we have certain contractual protections, our clients, including some of our largest clients, generally have flexibility to issue non-Visa products.Further, inIn certain circumstances, our financial institution clients may decide to terminate our contractual relationship on relatively short notice without paying significant early termination fees. Because a significant portion of our net revenue is concentrated among our largest clients, the loss of business from any one of these larger clients could harm our business, results of operations and financial condition. For more information, please see Note 14—Segment Information to our consolidated financial statements included in Item 8 of this report.In addition, itIt may also be difficult or costly for us to acquire or conduct business with financial institutions ormerchantssellers that have longstanding exclusive, or nearly exclusive, relationships with our competitors. These financial institutions ormerchantssellers may be more successful and may grow more quickly than our existing clients ormerchants.sellers.In addition, ifIf there is a consolidation or acquisition of one or more of our largest clients or co-brand partners by a financial institution client ormerchantseller with a strong relationship with one of our competitors, it could result in our business shifting to a competitor, which could put us at a competitive disadvantage and harm our business. - In addition, we face intense competitive pressure on the prices we charge our financial institution clients. In certain regions, we are increasingly facing competition from RTP networks, other payment facilitators offering lower pricing, and government involvement in domestic and cross-border payments. In order to stay competitive, we may need to adjust our pricing or offer incentives to our clients to grow payments volume, enter new market segments, adapt to regulatory changes, and expand their use and acceptance of Visa products and services. These include up-front cash payments, fee discounts, rebates, credits, performance-based incentives, marketing and other support payments that impact our net revenue and profitability. In addition, we offer incentives to certain
merchantssellers and acquirers to encourage them to route transactions to Visa. Pressures on pricing, incentives, fee discounts and rebates could moderate our growth. If we are not able to implement cost containment and productivity initiatives in other areas of our business or grow ourvolumesvolume in other ways to offset or absorb the financial impact of these incentives, fee discounts and rebates, it may harm our net revenue and profits. Merchants’Sellers’ and processors’ continued push to lower acceptance costs and challenge industry practices could harm our business.- We rely in part on
merchantssellers and their relationships with our clients or their agents to maintain and expand the use and acceptance of Visa products. Certainmerchantssellers andmerchant-affiliatedseller-affiliated groups have been exerting their influence in the global payments system in certain jurisdictions, such as the U.S., Australia, Canada and Europe, to attempt to lower acceptance costs paid bymerchantssellers to acquirers or their agents to accept payment products or services, by lobbying for new legislation, seeking regulatory intervention, filing lawsuits and in some cases, surcharging or refusing to accept Visa products. If they are successful in their efforts, we may face increased compliance and litigation expenses, issuers may decrease their issuance of our products, and consumer usage of our products could be adversely impacted. For example, in the U.S., certain stakeholders have raised concerns regarding how payment security standards and rules may impact debit routing choice and the cost of payment card acceptance.In addition to ongoing litigation related to theU.S.migration to EMV-capable cards and point-of-sale terminals, U.S. merchant-affiliatedseller-affiliated groups and processors have expressed concerns regarding the EMV certification process andsome policymakers have expressed concerns aboutthe roles of industry bodies such as EMVCo and the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council in the development of payment card standards.Additionally,Moreover, manymerchantssellers have advocated for lower acceptance costs in the form of reduced interchange rates, which could result in some issuers eliminating or reducing their promotion or use of Visa’s products and services, eliminating or reducing cardholder benefits such as rewards programs, or charging account holders increased or new fees for using Visa-branded products, all of which could negatively impact Visa’stransaction volumespayments volume and related revenue. Finally, somemerchantssellers and processors have advocated for changes to industry practices and Visa acceptance requirements at the point of sale, including the ability formerchantssellers to accept only certain types of Visa products, to mandate only PIN authenticated transactions, to differentiate or steer among Visa product types issued by different financial institutions, and to impose surcharges oncustomersconsumers presenting Visa products as their form of payment. A number of the issues flagged in this risk factor are subject to pending litigation. For more information, please see Note14—Enterprise-wide Disclosures and Concentration of Business20—Legal Matters to our consolidated financial statements included in Item 8 of this report. If successful, these efforts could adversely impact consumers’ usage of our products and decrease our overalltransaction volumespayments volume and net revenue, lead to regulatory enforcement and/or litigation that increases our compliance and litigation expenses, and ultimately harm our business. - We depend on relationships with financial institutions, acquirers, processors,
merchants,sellers, payment facilitators, ecommerce platforms, fintechs and other third parties. As noted above, ourOur relationships with industry participants are complex and require us to balance the interests of multiple third parties. For instance, we depend significantly on relationships with our financial institution clients and on their relationships with account holders andmerchantssellers to provide our products and services, and thereby compete effectively in the marketplace. We offer incentives tomerchants,sellers, acquirers, ecommerce platforms and processors to encourage routing preference and acceptance growth. We also engage in many payment card co-branding efforts withmerchants,sellers, who receive incentives from us. As emerging participants such as fintechs enter the payments industry, we engage in discussions to address the role they may play in the ecosystem, whether as, for example, an issuer,merchant,seller, ecommerce platform or digital wallet provider. As these and other relationships become more prevalent and take on a greater importance to our business, our success will increasingly depend on our ability to sustain and grow these relationships. In addition, we depend on our clients and third parties, including network partners, vendors and suppliers, to submit, facilitate and process transactions properly, provide various services associated with our payments network on our behalf, and otherwise adhere to our operating rules and applicable laws. As our clients expand their global footprint, their legal and regulatory obligations can become even more complex. From time to time, our relationships may be affected by actions of our clients and industry participants that may materially and adversely impact our business, products or services, and to the extent we or such parties fail to perform or deliver adequate services or comply with regulatory obligations, it may result in negative experiences for account holders or others when using their Visa-branded payment products, which could harm our business and reputation.- Our brand is globally recognized and is a key asset of our business. We believe that our clients and their account holders associate our brand with acceptance, security, convenience, speed and reliability. Our success depends in large part on our ability to maintain the value of our brand and reputation of our products and services in the payments ecosystem, elevate the brand through new and existing products, services and partnerships, and uphold our corporate reputation. The popularity of products that we have developed in partnership with technology companies and financial institutions as well as government actions that mandate other networks to process Visa-branded card transactions may have the potential to cause brand disintermediation at the point of sale, in ecommerce and mobile channels, and decrease the presence of our brand. Our brand reputation may also be negatively impacted by a number of factors, including authorization, clearing and settlement service disruptions; data security breaches; compliance failures by Visa, including by our employees, agents, clients, partners or suppliers; failure to meet expectations of our clients,
consumers,consumers or other stakeholders; negative perception of our industry, the industries of our clients, Visa-acceptingmerchants,sellers, or our clients’ customers and agents, including third-party payments providers; ill-perceived actions or affiliations by clients, partners or other third parties, such as sponsorship or co-brand partners; and fraudulent, or illegal activities using our payment products or services, and which we may not always be in a position to detect and/or prevent from occurring over our network. Our brand could also be negatively impacted when our products are used to facilitate payment for legal, but controversial, products and services,including,including adult content,cryptocurrencies, firearms,firearms and gambling activities. Additionally, these risks could be exacerbated if our financial institution partners and/ormerchantssellers fail to maintain necessary controls to ensure the legality of these transactions, if any legal liability associated with such goods or services is extended to ancillary participants in the value chain like payments networks, or if our network and industry become entangled in political or social debates concerning such legal, but controversial, commerce. If we are unable to maintain our reputation, the value of our brand may be impaired, which could harm our relationships with clients, account holders, employees, prospective employees, governments and the public, as well as impact our business. - More than half of our net revenue is earned outside the U.S. In addition, international cross-border transaction revenue represents a significant part of our net revenue and is an important part of our growth strategy. Our net revenue is dependent on the volume and number of payment transactions made by consumers, governments, and businesses whose spending patterns may be affected by economic, political, market, health and social events or conditions. Adverse macroeconomic conditions within the U.S. or internationally, including but not limited to recessions, inflation, rising interest rates, increase in tariff rates, high unemployment, currency fluctuations, actual or anticipated large-scale defaults or failures, rising energy prices,
ora slowdown or disruption of global trade, trade retaliation, government shutdowns, and reduced consumer, small business, government, and corporate spending, have a direct impact onour volumes, transactions and net revenue.international commerce. Our business depends on the smooth functioning of international financial systems and the free flow of commerce across borders. Any restrictions on the activities of multinational businesses, disruptions to global trade, or deterioration in international relations could materially and adversely affect our payments volume, transactions, client relationships, and net revenue. Any events or conditions that impair the functioning of the financial markets, tighten the credit market, or lead to a downgrade of our current credit rating could increase our future borrowing costs and impair our ability to access the capital and credit markets on favorable terms, which could affect our liquidity and capital resources, or significantly increase our cost of capital. Furthermore, in efforts to deal with adverse macroeconomic conditions, governments may introduce new or additional initiatives or requests to reduce or eliminate payment fees or other costs. In an overall soft global economy, such pricing measures could result in additional financial pressures on our business. - Geopolitical trends towards nationalism,
protectionism,protectionism and restrictive visa requirements, as well as continued activity and uncertainty around economic sanctions, tariffs or trade restrictions, including restrictions on the cross-border flow of data,also limitthe potential or threat of retaliatory international and domestic policies and actions, changing perceptions of U.S.-based companies in the regions where we operate or plan to operate, could impact the expansion of our business in certain regions and have resulted in us suspending our operations in other regions. In March 2022, we suspended our operations in Russia due to economic sanctions imposed on Russia, impacting Visa and its clients.In March 2022, we suspended our operations in Russia and asAs a result, we are no longer generating revenue from domestic and cross-border activities related to Russia. The war in Ukraine and the ongoing instability in the Middle East, and any resulting conflicts in the region, could have lasting impacts on the region and its economies, which could adversely affect our business. Changes in geopolitical conditions also increase the security risks described elsewhere in these risk factors. - In addition, outbreaks of illnesses, pandemics like COVID-19, or other local or global health issues, political uncertainties, international hostilities, armed conflicts, wars, civil unrest, climate-related events, including the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, impacts
toon or failures of the power grid, and natural disasters have to varying degrees negatively impacted our operations, clients, third-party suppliers, activities, and cross-border travel and spend.As a result of any of these factors, anyAny decline in cross-border travel and spend would impact our cross-bordervolumes,volume, the number of cross-border transactions we process and our currency exchange activities, which in turn would reduce our international transaction revenue.A decline in economic, political, market, health and socialThese events or conditions could impact our clients as well, and their decisions could reduce the number of cards, accounts, and credit lines of their account holders, and impact overall consumption by consumers and businesses, which would ultimately impact our net revenue.OurIn addition, our clients may implement cost-reduction initiatives that reduce or eliminate marketing budgets, and decrease spending onoptional or enhancedour value-addedservices from us.services. - Our
aspirationsability toaddressadjust to evolving corporate responsibility and sustainability (CRS) matters andconsiderationsrelated regulations could adversely affect our business and financial results or negatively impact our reputation. - Our ability to
achieveachieve, or make sufficient progress towards any of our CRS objectives is subject to numerous risks, many of which are outside of our control, including the evolving legal environment and regulatory requirements for the tracking and reporting of CRS standards or disclosures and the actions of suppliers, partners, and other third parties.TheseAccordingly, our goals maychangeevolve from time to time, implementation of these goals may require considerable investments, and ultimately, we cannot guaranteethat we willour ability to achievethem.or to make sufficient progress toward, any or all of our publicly stated goals. From time to time,thewe may restate previously reported data to reflect updated methodologies for reporting our CRSdata may be updated and previously reported data may be adjusted to reflectdata, an improvement in the availability and quality of data, changing assumptions, changes in the nature and scope of our operations,andor other changes in circumstances. This may result in a lack of consistent or meaningful comparative data from period to period or between us and other companies in the same industry.Further,Furthermore, where new laws or regulations are more stringent than current legal or regulatory requirements, we may experience increased compliance burdens and costs to meet such obligations. Because our stakeholders often hold differing views on our CRS-related goals and initiatives and we face conflicting directives from U.S. and international regulatory authorities, any failure, or perceived failure, to meet these evolving and varied stakeholder expectations and standards may result in negative attention in the media, reputational impacts, including an inaccurate perception or misrepresentation of our actual CRS practices, diversion of management’s attention and resources, and proxy fights, among other material adverse impacts on our business. Additionally, the goals or initiatives themselves could potentially subject us to litigation or investigations initiated by government authorities or private actors alleging that our activities related to CRS are anti-competitive, discriminatory or otherwise unlawful. - We indemnify issuers and acquirers for settlement losses they may suffer due to the failure of another issuer or acquirer to honor its settlement obligations in accordance with the Visa operating rules. This indemnification creates settlement risk for us due to the timing difference between the date of a payment transaction and the date of subsequent settlement. Our indemnification exposure is generally limited to the amount of unsettled Visa card payment transactions at any point in time and any subsequent amounts that may fall due
relatingto adjustments for previously processed transactions.ChangesIn addition, changes in the credit standing of our clients or concurrent settlement failures or insolvencies involving more than one of our largest clients, several of our smaller clients, significant sponsor banks through which non-financial institutions participate in the Visa network, or systemic operational failures could expose us to liquidity risk, and negatively impact our financial position. In certain instances, we may indemnify issuers or acquirers in situations in which a transaction is not processed by our system. Even if we have sufficient liquidity to cover a settlement failure or insolvency, we may be unable to recover the amount of such payment. This could expose us to significant losses and harm our business. See Note 12—Settlement Guarantee Management to our consolidated financial statements included in Item 8 of this report. - The global payments industry is undergoing significant and rapid technological change, including increased proliferation of mobile and other proximity and in-app payment technologies, ecommerce, tokenization, cryptocurrencies, distributed ledger and blockchain technologies, cloud-based encryption and authorization, and new authentication technologies such as biometrics, FIDO 2.0, 3D Secure 2.0 and dynamic cardholder verification values or dCVV2. As a result, we expect new services and technologies to continue to emerge and
evolve, including those developed by Visa such as our new flows offerings.evolve. For example,generative AIGenAI and agentic commerce solutions have emerged as an opportunity for Visa, its clients, suppliers,merchants,sellers and partners to innovate more quickly and better serve consumers. Rapid adoption and novel uses ofgenerative AIGenAI and agentic commerce across the marketplace may also introduce unique and unpredictable security risks to our systems, information, and the payments ecosystem. In addition to our own initiatives and innovations, we work closely with third parties, including potential competitors, for the development of, and access to, new technologies. It is difficult, however, to predict which technological developments or innovations will become widely adopted and how those technologies may be regulated. Moreover, some of the new technologies could be subject to intellectual property-related lawsuits or claims, potentially impacting our development efforts and/or requiring us to obtain licenses, implement design changes or discontinue our use. If we or our partners fail to adapt and keep pace with new technologies in the payments space in a timely manner, it could harm our ability to compete, decrease the value of our products and services to our clients, impact our intellectual property or licensing rights, harm our business and impact our future growth. - Our cybersecurity and processing systems, as well as those of financial institutions,
merchantssellers and third-party service providers, have experienced and may continue to experience errors, interruptions, delays or damage from a number ofcauses,causes includingpower outages,but not limited to, hardware, software and network failures, computer viruses, ransomware, malware or other destructive software, use of AI technologies by bad actors, internal design, manual or user errors, advanced or persistent cyber attacks, social engineering threats, such as phishing or deepfake schemes, including those using synthetic media, insider threats, terrorism, political tensions, war or other military conflicts, or civil unrest, security breaches of our physical premises, workplace violence or wrongdoing, catastrophic events, natural disasters, severe weather conditions and other effects from climate change. Because the tactics, techniques and procedures used to obtain unauthorized access, or to disable or degrade systems change frequently, have become increasingly more complex and sophisticated, and may be difficult to detect for periods of time, we may not anticipate these acts or respond adequately or timely. For example, cybercriminals have increasingly demonstrated advanced capabilities, such as use of zero-day vulnerabilities, and rapid integration of new technology such asgenerative AIGenAI are being used by threat actors to create sophisticated attacks that are increasingly automated,targeted,targeted and more difficult to defend against. Our own use and deployment of GenAI technologies could expand our cybersecurity attack surface, increasing exposure to breaches, fraud, unauthorized transactions and other vulnerabilities. In addition,there is risk thatthird-party suppliers of hardware and infrastructurerequired tothat operate our data centers and support employee productivity could be impacted by supply chain disruptions, such as manufacturing, shipping delays, and service disruption due to cyber attacks. An extended supply chain or service disruption could also impact processing or delivery of technology services. Moreover, due to the interconnectivity and complexity of information systems and their reliance on common systems, software and vendors, disruptions or degradations have had, and will likely continue to have, wide-reaching consequences, including the potential to disrupt the overall financial system and other key systems in the global economy.Overall, suchSuch attacks and breaches haveresulted,resulted and may continue to resultin,in fraudulent activity andultimately,financial losses to Visa’s financial institution clients,merchantssellers or third-party service providers. Furthermore, ourOur visibility and role in the global payments industry also puts our company at a greater risk of being targeted by hackers. In the normal course of our business, we have been the target of malicious cyber activity. We have been, and may continue to be, impacted by attacks and data security breaches of financial institutions,merchants,sellers, and third-party service providers. We are also aware of instances where governments have directed or sponsored attacks against some of our financial institution clients, and other instances wheremerchantssellers and issuers have encountered substantial data security breaches affecting their customers, some of whom were Visa account holders. Given the increase inonline banking, ecommercepayments through ecommerce, social media andother online activity,mobile channels, we continue to see increased cyber and payment fraud activity, as cybercriminals attempt phishing and social engineering scams, distributed denial of service attacks and other disruptive actions.- The security measures and procedures we, our financial institution and
merchantseller clients, othermerchantssellers and third-party service providers in the payments ecosystem have in place to protect sensitive consumer data and other information may not be implemented effectively, may differ in scope and complexity across different ecosystem participants, or may not be successful or sufficient to counter all data security breaches, cyber incidents and attacks or system failures. In some cases, the mitigation efforts may be dependent on third parties who may not follow the required contractual standards, who may not be able to timely patch vulnerabilities or fix security defects, or whose hardware, software or network services may be subject to error, defect, delay, outage or lack appropriatemalware preventionsecurity measures to prevent breaches or data exfiltration incidents. Cyber incidents and attacks can have cascading impacts that unfold with increasing speed across our internal networks and systems and those of our partners and clients. In addition,Furthermore, as a global financial services company, Visa is increasingly subject tocomplexcomplex, varied, andvariedrapidly evolving cybersecurity regulations and cyber incident reporting requirements across numerous jurisdictions. For example, governments around the world have recently passed or are considering new critical infrastructure cybersecurity laws and regulations, some of which may apply to Visa. With the often short timeframes required for cyber incident reporting, there is a risk that Visa or its third-party service providers will fail to meet the reporting deadlines for any given incident. It may take considerable time for us to investigate and evaluate the full impact of cyber incidents, particularly for sophisticated attacks. These factors may inhibit our ability to provide prompt, full and reliable information about the cyber incident to our clients, partners and regulators, as well as to the public. In the event we are found to be out of compliance, we could be subject to monetary damages, civil and criminal penalties, litigation, investigations and proceedings, and damage to our reputation and brand.- Any of these events, individually or in the aggregate, could significantly disrupt our operations; impact the availability and integrity of our systems, applications, or the systems of our third-party service providers; result in the unauthorized disclosure, release, gathering, monitoring, misuse, loss or destruction of confidential, proprietary, sensitive and personal information (including account data information) or data security compromises; impact our clients and consumers; increase the risk of fraudulent transactions; damage our reputation and brand; result in litigation or claims, violations of applicable privacy and other laws, and increased regulatory review or scrutiny, investigations, actions, fines or penalties; result in damages or changes to our business practices; decrease the overall use and acceptance of our products; decrease our volume, net revenue and future growth prospects; financial losses to Visa’s financial institution clients, sellers or third-party service providers, and be costly, time consuming and difficult to remedy. There can be no assurance that our efforts will prevent all such threats. In the event of damage or disruption to our business due to these occurrences, we may not be able to successfully and quickly recover all of our critical business functions, assets, and data through our business continuity
program.program and we may not be able to notify affected third parties when appropriate. Furthermore, while we maintain insurance, our coverage may not sufficiently cover all types of losses or claims that may arise. In addition, in the case of any cyber-attack or other security incident information or security breach or technology failure arising from third-party systems impacting us, any third-party indemnification may not be applicable or sufficient to address the impact of such incidents. - We may be unable to attract, hire and retain a highly qualified
and diverseworkforce, including key management. - The talents and efforts of our employees, particularly our key management, are vital to our success. The market for highly skilled workers and leaders in our industry, especially in fintech, technology, AI, cybersecurity and other specialized areas, is extremely competitive. Our management team has significant industry experience and would be difficult to replace. We may be unable to retain them or to attract, hire or retain other highly qualified employees, particularly if we do not offer employment terms that are competitive with the rest of the labor market. Ongoing changes in laws and policies regarding immigration, travel and work authorizations have made it more difficult for employees to work in, or transfer among, jurisdictions in which we have operations and could continue to impair our ability to attract, hire and retain qualified employees. Failure to attract, hire, develop, motivate and retain highly qualified
and diverseemployee talent, especially in light of changing worker expectations and talent marketplacevariability regarding flexible work models; to meet our goals related to fostering an inclusive and diverse culture orvariability; to adequately address potential increased scrutiny of ourinclusion and diversity-relatedtalent-related programs and initiatives; to develop and implement an adequate succession plan for the management team; or to maintain our strong corporate culture of fosteringinnovation,innovation and collaborationand inclusion in our current hybrid model; or to design and successfully implement flexible work models that meet the expectations of employees and prospective employeescould impact our workforce development goals, impact our ability to achieve our business objectives, and adversely affect our business and our future success. - The conversions of our class
BB-1, B-2 and class C common stock or series A, B and C preferred stock into shares of class A common stock would result in voting dilution to, and could adversely impact the market priceof,of our existing class A common stock. - The market price of our class A common stock could fall as a result of many factors. The value of our class B-1, B-2 and C common stock and series A, B and C preferred stock is tied to the value of the class A common stock. Under our U.S. retrospective responsibility plan, upon final resolution of our U.S. covered litigation, all class B-1 and B-2 common stock will become convertible into class A common stock. Under our Europe retrospective responsibility plan, Visa will continue to release value from the series B and series C preferred stock in stages based on developments in current and potential litigation. The series B and series C preferred stock will become fully convertible to series A preferred stock or class A common stock no later than 2028 (subject to a holdback to cover any pending claims). Conversion of our class B-1, B-2 and C common stock into class A common stock, or our series A, B and C preferred stock into class A common stock, would increase the amount of class A common stock outstanding, which would dilute the voting power of existing class A common
stockholders.shareholders. In addition, the sale of significant portions of converted class A common stock could adversely impact the market price of our existing class A common stock. - Holders of our class B-1, B-2 and C common stock and series A, B and C preferred stock may have different interests than our class A common
stockholdersshareholders concerning certain significant transactions. - Provisions contained in our certificate of incorporation and bylaws and our capital structure could delay or prevent a merger, takeover attempt or change in control that our
stockholdersshareholders may consider favorable.•noFor example, except for limited exceptions: (1) no person may beneficially own more than 15 percent of our class A common stock (or 15 percent of our total outstanding common stock on an as-converted basis), unless our board of directors approves the acquisition of such shares in advance;•no(2) no competitor or an affiliate of a competitor may hold more than 5 percent of our total outstanding common stock on an as-converted basis;•the(3) the affirmative votes of the class B-1, B-2 and C common stock and series A, B and C preferred stock are required for certain types of consolidations or mergers;•only(4) our shareholders may only take action during a shareholders’ meeting and may not act by written consent; and (5) only our board of directors, Chair, or CEO or anystockholdersshareholders who have owned continuously for at least one year not less than 15 percent of the voting power of all shares of class A common stock outstanding may call a special meeting ofstockholders.shareholders. - Separately, there continues to be interest in regulation of credit interchange fees and routing practices by members of Congress and state legislators in the U.S. In June 2023, legislation was reintroduced in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, which among other things, would require large issuing banks to offer a choice of at least two unaffiliated networks over which electronic credit transactions may be processed. Similar legislation was introduced in the previous Congress in 2022 but failed to advance. The current legislation has additional bipartisan support, and while the ultimate outcome of the legislation remains unclear, its sponsors continue to strongly advocate for its passage. Such laws may also impose significant technical and compliance burdens on our business.
- In Asia Pacific, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) which already regulates interchange, continues to monitor issues related to the cost of acceptance, the potential merits of mandating merchant choice routing on dual network debit cards and competition in digital wallet payments. In 2022, the New Zealand Parliament passed legislation capping domestic interchange rates for debit and credit products, and the government remains focused on lowering costs of digital payments to businesses and consumers.
- That agreement has been extended through 2029.
- Increased oversight could also include new criteria for member participation and merchant access to our payment systems. Furthermore, as governments increase their focus on cybersecurity, parts of our business have become considered significant or critical infrastructure by certain central banks.
- In Europe, with the support of the European Central Bank, a group of European banks announced their intent to launch a pan-European payment system, the European Payments Initiative (EPI). While EPI subsequently announced a focus on account-to-account instant payments across a range of use cases, the purported motivation behind EPI is to reduce the risks of disintermediation of European providers by international technology companies and continued reliance on international payments networks for intra-Europe card transactions. For example, in the aftermath of U.S. and European sanctions against Russia and the decision by U.S. payments networks, including Visa, to suspend operations in the country, some countries have expressed concerns about their reliance on U.S. financial services companies, including payments networks, and have taken steps to bolster the development of domestic solutions.
- In July 2023, the U.S.
- Legal requirements relating to the collection, storage, handling, use, disclosure, transfer, disposal and security of personal data continue to evolve, and we are subject to an increasing number of privacy, data protection, cybersecurity and AI requirements around the world. Additionally, privacy laws in other regions, such as China’s Personal Information Protection Law and India’s Personal Data Protection Act, may have extraterritorial application and include restrictions on cross-border data transfers, extensive notification and localization requirements, and substantial compliance and audit obligations.
- There is thus uncertainty on what new laws will look like and how existing laws will apply to our development, use, and deployment of AI. In the midst of this uncertainty, we may face challenges due to the complexity and rapidly changing nature of AI technology and applicable laws. The EU has adopted a comprehensive AI Act that applies harmonized rules across Europe with the aim of fostering innovation and respecting fundamental rights. The EU AI Act comes into force in stages with the key provisions related to high risk AI coming into force in August 2026. There is still limited guidance on the EU AI Act, but it could, depending on how provisions are interpreted and enforced, limit the ability to create and deploy AI systems for uses deemed high-risk in the EU or add increased compliance costs associated with these systems.
- Government actions or initiatives such as the Dodd-Frank Act, the IFR in Europe, or RTP initiatives by governments such as the U.S. Federal Reserve’s FedNow or the Central Bank of Brazil’s Pix system may provide competitors with increased opportunities to derive competitive advantages from these business models, and may create new competitors, including in some cases the government itself. Similarly, regulation in Europe under PSD2 and the IFR may require us to open up access to, and allow participation in, our network to additional participants, and reduce the infrastructure investment and regulatory burden on competitors. In addition to the open banking provisions under PSD2, efforts to implement or facilitate open banking and open finance requirements are underway across a number of countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada and the U.S., which could impose additional requirements on financial institutions or others regarding access to and use of financial data. We also run the risk of disintermediation due to factors such as emerging technologies and platforms, including mobile payments, alternative payment credentials, other ledger technologies or payment forms, and by virtue of increasing bilateral agreements between entities that prefer not to use our payments network for processing transactions. For example, merchants could process transactions directly with issuers, or processors could process transactions directly with issuers and acquirers.
- •Many countries or regions are developing or promoting domestic networks, switches and RTP systems (e.g., U.S., Brazil, India and Europe) and in some countries the government itself owns and operates these RTP systems (e.g., Brazil). To the extent these governments mandate local banks and merchants to use and accept these systems for domestic or other transactions, prohibit international payments networks, like Visa, from participating on those systems, and/or impose restrictions or prohibitions on international payments networks from offering payment services on such transactions, we could face the risk of our business being disintermediated in those countries. For example, in some regions (Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East), including through intergovernmental organizations such as the
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the GCC, some countries are at varying stages of exploring or operationalizing the cross-border connectivity of such domestic systems. Similarly, India has expressed interest in expanding its digital public infrastructure, which includes its RTP system, Unified Payments Interface (UPI), outside the country and for cross-border payments. Currently, international payment networks like Visa are unable to participate in UPI.
- •Parties that process our transactions may try to minimize or eliminate our position in the payments value chain.
- During fiscal 2022, economic sanctions were imposed on Russia by the U.S., the EU, United Kingdom and other jurisdictions and authorities, impacting Visa and its clients. The war in Ukraine and any further actions by, or in response to such actions by, Russia or its allies could have lasting impacts on Ukraine as well as other regional and global economies, any or all of which could adversely affect our business. The ongoing military conflict in the Middle East, and any resulting conflicts in the region, could potentially have similar negative impacts.
- Finally, as governments, investors and other stakeholders face additional pressures to accelerate actions to address climate change and other environmental, governance and social topics, governments are implementing regulations and investors and other stakeholders are imposing new expectations or focusing investments in ways that may cause significant shifts in disclosure, commerce and consumption behaviors that may have negative impacts on our business.
- We are subject to laws, regulations and other measures that govern a wide range of topics, including those that are related to matters beyond our core products and services, such as matters that touch upon sustainability, climate change, human capital, inclusion and diversity, and human rights. A wide range of stakeholders, including governments, customers, employees, and investors, are increasingly focused on and are developing expectations regarding these corporate responsibility matters. We have established CRS-related initiatives, adopted reporting frameworks, and announced several related goals.
- Certain of our regulators have proposed or adopted, or may propose or adopt, rules or standards related to these matters that would apply to our business. New regulations have been enacted and/or are expected in several jurisdictions, including the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, the SEC climate-related disclosures that could require disclosure of climate-related information and the State of California’s legislation requiring broad disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions and other climate-related information. Prevailing CRS standards and expectations may also reflect conflicting values or objectives, which can result in our practices being judged by standards that are continually evolving and are not always clear.
- Our stakeholders often hold differing views on our CRS-related goals and initiatives, which may result in negative attention in traditional and social media or a negative perception of our response to concerns regarding these matters. In addition, we also face potentially conflicting supervisory directives as certain U.S. regulatory and non-U.S. authorities have prioritized CRS-related issues while Congress and certain U.S. state governments have signaled pursuing potentially conflicting priorities. These circumstances, among others, may result in pressure from investors, unfavorable reputational impacts, including inaccurate perceptions or a misrepresentation of our actual CRS practices, diversion of management’s attention and resources, and proxy fights, among other material adverse impacts on our business. Any failure, or perceived failure, by us to adhere to our public statements, comply fully with developing interpretations of CRS laws and regulations, or meet evolving and varied stakeholder expectations and standards could negatively impact our business, reputation, financial condition, and operating results.
- Numerous and evolving cybersecurity threats, including advanced and persistent cyber attacks, targeted attacks against our employees and trusted partners, insider threats, social engineering threats, such as phishing or deepfake schemes, including those using synthetic media, could compromise the confidentiality, availability and integrity of data in our systems, particularly on our internet-facing applications, or the systems of our third-party service providers. Despite our security measures and programs to protect our systems and data, and prevent, detect and respond to data security incidents, there can be no assurance that our efforts will prevent all such threats.
- B-1 and B-2 common stock will become convertible into class A common stock.
- For example, except for limited exceptions:
- •our stockholders may only take action during a stockholders’ meeting and may not act by written consent; and
- Although their voting rights are limited, holders of our class B-1, B-2 and C common stock and, in certain specified circumstances, holders of our series A, B and C preferred stock, can vote on certain significant transactions. With respect to our class B-1, B-2 and C common stock, these transactions include a proposed consolidation or merger, a decision to exit our core payments business and any other vote required under Delaware law. With respect to our series A, B and C preferred stock, voting rights are limited to proposed consolidations or mergers in which holders of the series A, B and C preferred stock would receive shares of stock or other equity securities with preferences, rights and privileges that are not substantially identical to the preferences, rights and privileges of the applicable series of preferred stock; or, in the case of series B and C preferred stock, holders would receive securities, cash or other property that is different from what our class A common
stockholdersshareholders would receive. Because the holders of classes of capital stock other than class A common stock are our current and former financial institution clients, they may have interests that diverge from our class A commonstockholders.shareholders. As a result, the holders of these classes of capital stock may not have the same incentive to approve a corporate action that may be favorable to the holders of class A common stock, and their interests may otherwise conflict with interests of our class A commonstockholders.shareholders.